Abstract. Many cryptographic protocols and attacks on these protocols make use of the fact that the order in which encryption is performed does not affect the result of the encryption, i.e., encryption is commutative. However, most models for the automatic analysis of cryptographic protocols can not handle such encryption functions since in these models the message space is considered a free term algebra. In this paper, we present an NP decision procedure for the insecurity of protocols that employ RSA encryption, which is one of the most important instances of commuting public key encryption.
Introduction
Most automatic analysis techniques for security protocols take as a simplifying hypothesis that the cryptographic algorithms are perfect: One needs the decryption key to extract the plaintext from the ciphertext, and also, a ciphertext can be generated only with the appropriate key and message (no collision). Under these assumptions and given a bound on the number of protocol sessions, the insecurity problem is decidable (see e.g. [1, 12, 4, 8] ). However, it is an open question whether this result remains valid when the intruder model is extended to take into account even simple algebraic properties of low-level cryptographic primitives. This question is important since many security flaws are the consequence of these properties and many protocols are based on these operators (see, e.g., [13, 11] ).
Only recently the perfect encryption assumption for protocol analysis has been slightly relaxed. In [9] , unification algorithms are designed for handling properties of Diffie-Hellman cryptographic systems. Although these results are useful, they do not solve the more general insecurity problem. In [6, 7] , decidability of security has been proved for protocols that employ exclusive or. In [5] , we have extended this result to protocols that are based on Diffie-Hellman exponentiation. DiffieHellman exponentiation has also been studied in [10] and [3] . However, in the former work no decision procedure is provided and in the latter severe restrictions are imposed on the protocol and intruder model.
In this paper, we show that the insecurity problem for protocols that use commuting publickey encryption operators (such as RSA encryption with common module) admits an NP decision procedure for a finite number of sessions (see the main result in Section 4). In Section 2, we present a very simple protocol illustrating that protocols and attacks on these protocols may rely on the commutativity of encryption.
This problem can be related to the analysis of Diffie-Hellman protocols as studied in [5] since Diffie-Hellman exponentiation and commuting public-key encryption, which in case of RSA also involves exponentiation, share algebraic properties. However, there are significant differences.
First, the intruder capabilities differ. In case of public-key encryption the intruder is not able to compute the inverse of exponents, e.g., given a public key (n, e) and a cipher text c = m e mod n, the intruder can not compute the private key d and then by computing c d mod n obtain m.
Conversely, in the Diffie-Hellman setting, exponentiation is done modulo a publicly known prime, and thus, it is computationally feasible to compute the inverse of exponents, e.g., given m = g a·b and b where g generates the multiplicative group induced by the prime p, the intruder can easily invert b modulo p − 1 obtaining b −1 (in case an inverse exists) and by computing m b −1 obtain g a . Second, in [5] the intruder can not obtain inverses of messages, such as b −1 directly, but only use them in exponents. However, in the public-key setting we consider here, this would be unrealistic since inverses correspond to private keys, and of course, we need to allow the intruder to possess such keys (own private keys and private keys of dishonest principals).
As a result of these differences, the proofs differ as well. First, while roughly speaking in [5] we reduce the insecurity problem to solving linear equations in integers, we now obtain linear equations in non-negative integers. Also, we need to extend the intruder to allow private keys in her possession. To minimize the changes necessary compared to the proof in [5] , we consider private keys as atomic messages and extend the normalization function to make sure that in exponents public and private keys cancel each other out. This allows us to lift the proofs presented in [5] to the setting considered here.
A Simple Example
Let us illustrate by the well-known RSA protocol that protocols and attacks on these protocols may rely on the commutativity property of public key encyrption. Using the common Alice-Bob notation, the RSA protocol is given as follows:
In this protocol, a common RSA module n is assumed. The public key of A is (n, K A ) and the one for B is (n, K B ). The message secret is some non-negative integer < n. The term {secret}
By the algebraic properties of exponentiation, we have that {{secret}
where K A is A's private key. Thus, the protocol itself uses the commutativity of encryption. Since B is not authenticated in this protocol, it is obvious that the intruder I can impersonate B, by simply playing B's role while using her own public key K I .
The Protocol and Intruder Model
The protocol and intruder model we describe here extend standard models for automatic analysis of security protocols in two respects. First, messages can be built using the operator { } p , which stands for encryption by a multiset of public/private keys described as a product of public/private keys. For instance, we have that {{m}
In particular, we can model the commutativity of public key encryption. Second, in addition to the standard Dolev-Yao intruder capabilities, the intruder is equipped with the ability to perform this generalized encryption with any set of public or private keys she knows (we even allow arbitrary messages). For instance, if she happens to know A's private key K A and the message c = {m}
In what follows, we provide a formal definition of our model by defining terms, messages, protocols, the intruder, and attacks.
Terms and Messages
The set of terms term is defined as the union of roots (also called standard terms) and products (also called non-standard terms) in the following grammar:
where A is a finite set of constants (atomic messages), containing principal names, nonces, keys, and the constants 1 and secret; K is a subset of A denoting the set of public and private keys; V is a finite set of variables; and IN is the set of non-negative integers. We assume that there is a bijection · on K which maps every public (private) key k to its corresponding private (public) key k . The binary symbol ·, · is called pairing, the binary symbol {·} s · is called symmetric encryption, the binary symbol {·} p · is public key encryption. Note that a symmetric key can be any standard term and that for public key encryption the key can be any non-standard term (product). The non-negative integers occurring in products are called product exponents.
A ground term (also called message) is a term without variables. Like a term, it can be standard or non-standard. A (ground) substitution is a mapping from V into the set of standard (ground) terms. The application of a substitution σ to a term t (a set of terms E) is written tσ (Eσ), and is defined as expected.
We now formulate the algebraic properties of terms. Besides commutativity and associativity of the product operator we consider the following properties where t is a standard term, M 1 , M 2 are products, k ∈ K, k is the corresponding inverse key to k, and z, z are non-negative integers:
A normal form t of a term t is obtained by exhaustively applying these identities from left to right. Note that t is uniquely determined up to commutativity and associativity of the product operator. Two terms t and t are equivalent if t = t . The notion of normal form extends in the obvious way to sets of terms and substitutions. We illustrate the notion of a normal form by some examples: 
Protocols
Protocols are defined as follows.
Definition 1.
A protocol rule is of the form R ⇒ S where R and S are standard terms.
A protocol P is a tuple ({R i ⇒ S i | i ∈ I}, < I , E) where E is a finite normalized set of standard messages with 1 ∈ E, the initial intruder knowledge, I is a finite (index) set, < I is a partial ordering on I, and R i ⇒ S i , for every i ∈ I, is a protocol rule such that 1. the (standard) terms R i and S i are normalized, 2. for all x ∈ V(S i ), there exists j ≤ I i such that x ∈ V(R j ), and 3. for every subterm {t 1 } p t z 2 2 ···t zn n of R i , there exists r ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that V(t l ) ⊆ ∪ j< I i V(R j ) for every l ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {r}. Condition 1. in the above definition is not an actual restriction. One obtains an equivalent protocol (in the sense that the same attacks are possible) by normalizing the R i and S i in the protocol rules in case they are not normalized already. Roughly speaking, Condition 2. guarantees that a principal can only output messages she has learned before. Finally, Condition 3. ensures that every single protocol rule can be applied deterministically to an input message. These conditions do not seem to exclude realistic protocols. See [5] for more detailed remarks on the above conditions. In our protocol model, the RSA protocol (Section 2) can formally be state as follows where we assume that A runs one instance of the protocol as initiator and B runs one instance as responder. The protocol consists of three protocol rules denoted (A, 1), (A, 2), and (B, 1) with (A, 1) = 1 ⇒ {secret}
, and (B, 1) = y ⇒ {y}
where (A, 1) and (A, 2) denote the first and second protocol step performed by A, respectively, and (B, 1) denotes B's protocol step. The partial ordering only satifies (A, 1) < (A, 2), and thus, makes sure that (A, 1) must be performed before (A, 2). The initial intruder knowledge is {1, K I , K I }, i.e., besides the constant 1, the intruder knows her public and private key.
The Intruder Model and Attacks
Given a finite normalized set E of messages, the (infinite) set forge(E) of messages the intruder can derive from E is the smallest set satisfying the following conditions:
1. E ⊆ forge(E). 2. If m, m ∈ forge(E), then m ∈ forge(E) and m ∈ forge(E). Conversely, if m, m ∈ forge(E), then m, m ∈ forge(E). While the first three conditions are standard for Diffie-Hellman intruders, the last condition, which gives the intruder the ability to perform commuting public key encryption, is new. We call this extended intruder the RSA intruder. Note that by performing pubic key encryption, the intruder can both encrypt and decrypt messages. Also note that if E is a set of normalized messages, then so is forge(E).
If {m}
We now define attacks. In an attack on a protocol P , the intruder (nondeterministically) chooses some execution order for P , i.e., a linearization of the protocol rules which is compatible with the partial ordering, and then tries to produce input messages for the protocol rules. These input messages are derived from the intruder's initial knowledge and the output messages produced by executing the protocol rules. The aim of the intruder is to derive the message secret.
Definition 2. Let P = ({R j ⇒ S j | j ∈ I}, < I , S 0 ) be a protocol. Then an attack on P consists of a linearization R 1 ⇒ S 1 , . . . , R k ⇒ S k of the protocol rules in P assuming k = Card(I) which is compatible with < I and a normalized ground substitution σ of the variables occurring in P such that 1. R i σ ∈ forge( S 0 , S 1 σ, ..., S i−1 σ ) for every i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and 2. secret ∈ forge( S 0 , S 1 σ, ..., S k σ ).
The decision problem we are interested in is the following set of protocols:
Insecure := {P | there exists an attack on P }.
It can easily be checked that the RSA-protocol as formally described in Section 3.2 is insecure according to our definition: The intruder can impersonate B.
Main Theorem
The main result of this paper is the following: Theorem 1. For the RSA intruder, the problem Insecure is NP-complete.
As mentioned in the introduction, the proof follows the same lines as the one for Diffie-Hellman exponentiation presented in [5] . Here we only provide a very brief proof sketch.
NP-hardness can easily be established (see for instance [1] ). The NP decision procedure first guesses an execution order of the protocol rules and a ground substutition σ of size polynomially bounded in the size of the protocol, and then checks whether condition 1. and 2. of Defintion 2 are met. This check can be done in polynomial time. More precisely, consider the derivation problem:
where E is a finite set of normalized standard messages and m is a normalized standard message (both given as DAG). We can show: Proposition 1. For the RSA intruder, DERIVE can be decided in deterministic polynomial time.
The involved part of the proof of Theorem 1 is to show that when there is an attack on a protocol P , then there exists an attack of size polynomially bounded in the size of the protocol. This proof is done in two steps. First, it is shown that the number of subterms occurring in σ can polynomially be bounded in the size of P . Note that this does not bound the size of product exponents in σ. Therefore, in a second step, it is shown that the size of product exponents can polynomially be bounded in the size of P . This is done as follows: Given an attack with substitution σ, the product exponents in σ are replaced by variables (taking non-negative integers) yielding a symbolic substition σ Z . Now, we associate a linear Diophantine equation system in non-negative integers (of polynomial size in P ) with the attack which constraints the variables in σ Z (and auxiliary variables) such that when instantiating σ Z by a non-negative solution of the equation system this also gives an attack on P . By [2] , the size of the solutions can polynomially be bounded in the size of the equation system, and thus, P . This shows that the size of product exponents can polynomially be bounded in the size of P .
Conclusion
We have shown that the security problem for a class of protocols with commuting public key encryptions is in NP. This result was obtained by a reduction to the satisfiability of linear diophantine equations on IN . The result generalizes easily to the more common case where we only have subset of commuting keys. It would be interesting to characterize a class of algebraic properties that can be captured by our approach.
